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REAPPRAISAL OF STATE INTERESTS IN OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASE SALES UNDER
THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT:
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR v. CALIFORNIA
The oil and gas resources of the outer continental shelf (OCS)1 rep-
resent both a vital source of energy2 and a potential hazard3 for sur-
rounding ecosystems. In an attempt to balance these competing
concerns, Congress passed the Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA)4 which encourages states to accept managerial responsibility
1. 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1982) defines outer continental shelf as "all submerged
lands lying seaward and outside of the areas of lands beneath navigable waters [title to
which is held by the coastal states] and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the
United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control." Id. The term "outer
continental shelf" does not include submerged lands that are within three miles of a
state's coast. Id. at § 1301. For a discussion of federal and state ownership of sub-
merged lands within the jurisdiction of the United States, see Breeden, Federalism and
the Development of Outer Continental Shelf Mineral Resources, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1107,
1109-12 (1976).
2. See H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1450, 1460. See also BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT,
U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, PRO-
POSED 1981 OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE OFFSHORE CEN-
TRAL AND NORTHERN CALIFORNIA OCS SALE No. 53, 1-1 (1980).
3. Possible hazards include "oil spills, air pollution from hydrocarbon emissions
generated by loading of barges or tankers with oil, obstruction of shipping channels,
adverse effects of energy production related industrial facilities on scenic coastal areas
with tourist based economies and fouling of fishing gear on underwater pipelines and
other facilities." Deller, Federalism and Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing: Must Federal
Tract Selections and Lease Stipulations Be Consistent With State Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Programs?, 14 U.C.D.L. REV. 105, 113 n.33 (1980).
4. Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64
(1982)). The congressional declaration of policy is contained in § 1452 of the CZMA
which provides in pertinent part:
The Congress finds and declares that it is the national policy (1) to preserve, pro-
tect, develop, and where possible to restore or enhance, the resources of the na-
tion's coastal zone for this and succeeding generations; (2) to encourage and assist
the states to exercise effectively their responsibilities in the coastal zone through the
development and implementation of management programs to achieve wise use of
land and water resources of the coastal zone giving full consideration to ecological,
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for their respective coastal zones 5 and at the same time provides lim-
ited assurance of the compatibility of federal activities in adjacent ar-
eas.6 Congress and the courts, however, frequently criticize the
CZMA for its ambiguity and lack of effectiveness in resolving clashes
between federal energy development policies and state environmental
concerns.7 Reviewing one such conflict, the Supreme Court in Secre-
cultural, historic, and esthetic values as well as to needs for economic development,
(3) to encourage the preparation of special area management plans which pro-
vide for increased specificity in protecting significant natural resources, reasonable
coastal-dependent economic growth, improved protection of life and property in
hazardous areas, and improved predictability in governmental decisionmaking; and
(4) to encourage the participation and cooperation of the public, state and local
governments, and interstate and other regional agencies, as well as of the Federal
agencies having programs affecting the coastal zone.
Id.
5. Id. Section 1453 defines "coastal zone" as:
[T]he coastal waters (including the lands therein and thereunder) and the adjacent
shorelands (including the waters therein and thereunder), strongly influenced by
each other and in proximity to the shorelines of the several coastal states, and
includes islands, transitional and intertidal areas, saltmarshes, wetlands, and
beaches. The zone extends, in Great Lakes Waters, to the international boundary
between the United States and Canada and, in other areas, seaward to the outer
limit of the United States territorial sea. The zone extends inland from the shore-
line only to the extent necessary to control shorelands, the uses of which have a
direct and significant impact on the coastal waters. Excluded from the coastal zone
are lands the use of which is held in trust by the Federal Government, its officers or
agents.
Id. Cf Ball, Good Old American Permits: Madisonian Federalism on the Territorial Sea
and Continental Shelf, 12 ENVTL. L. 620, 630-37 (1982) (criticizes coastal zone bounda-
ries as useless "lines drawn on water").
The territorial sea for states bordering the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans extends three
geographical miles seaward from the coastline. United States v. California, 381 U.S.
139, 145-48 (1965).
See infra text accompanying notes 41-45 for a discussion of the incentives offered by
the federal government to coastal states.
6. See infra notes 37-63 and accompanying text.
7. For example, Gerry E. Studds, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Ocean-
ography has stated, "I reread the statute several times verbatim, which is something
none ought to be condemned to do, and I think particularly that sections 307 and 308
challenge anyone whose native tongue is English to discern what Congress meant when
it wrote those sections." Proposed Amendments to the Coastal Zone Management Act,
Hearings on H.R. 6956, H.R. 6979 Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the Comm.
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 88 (1980).
In American Petroleum Inst. v. Knecht, 456 F. Supp. 889 (C.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 609
F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1979), the district court wrote:
[F]or the high purpose of improving and maintaing felicitous conditions in the
coastal areas of the United States, the Congress has undertaken a legislative solu-
tion, the application of which is so complex as to make it almost wholly unmanage-
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tary of the Interior v. California' determined that OCS oil and gas lease
sales are not activities directly affecting adjoining coastal zones within
the meaning of the CZMA and thus need not be consistent with state
coastal zone management programs.9
In Secretary of the Interior v. California,'° respondents1 challenged
the Department of the Interior's (DOI) plans to sell OCS oil and gas
leases' 2 without providing a review of the sale's consistency with Cali-
able. In the course of the legislative process, there obviously come into conflict
many competing interests which, in typical fashion, the Congress sought to accom-
modate, only to create thereby a morass of problems between the private sector, the
public sector, the federal bureaucracy, the state legislature, the state bureaucracy,
and all of the administrative agencies appurtenant thereto.
456 F. Supp. at 896.
8. 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984).
9. Id. at 672. 16 U.S.C. § 1453(12) (1982) defines "management program" as:
[I]nclud[ing], but not limited to, a comprehensive statement in words, maps, illus-
trations, or other media of communication, prepared and adapted by the state in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter setting forth objectives, policies, and
standards to guide public and private uses of lands and waters in the coastal zone.
Id.
See infra notes 46-52, 58-59 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
CZMA's consistency requirements.
10. 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984). See infra notes 77-105 and accompanying text for a de-
tailed discussion of this opinion.
11. Respondents are plaintiffs in the original action. The State of California and
numerous environmental groups initiated the action by filing separate but comparable
complaints. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 104 S. Ct. 656, 660 n.3 (1984).
Plaintiffs included the California Coastal Commission, the California Air Resources
Board, the California Resources Agency, the California Department of Fish and Game,
the California Department of Conservation, the Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, Friends of the Sea Otter, and the Environ-
mental Coalition on Lease Sale No. 53. California ex rel. Brown v. Watt, 520 F. Supp.
1359, 1365 (C.D. Cal. 1981), modified, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom.
Secretary of the Interior v. California, 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984).
Various political subdivisions of the State of California intervened as plaintiffs in the
suit brought by the state. 520 F. Supp. at 1365. Among these were the Counties of
Humboldt, Main, Mendocino, Monterey, San Diego, San Luis Obispo, San Mateo,
Santa Barbara, Santa Cruz, and Sonoma, and the cities of Brisbane, Los Angeles, San
Luis Obispo, Santa Cruz, Santa Monica, and Seaside. Id.
Defendants named in additon to the Secretary of the Interior were the United States
Department of the Interior, the United States Bureau of Land Management, and Robert
Burford (Director, United States Bureau of Land Management). Id.
Petroleum concerns intervening as parties defendant included the Western Oil and
Gas Association, Amoco Production Co., Atlantic Richfield Co., Cities Service Co.,
Conoco, Inc., Elf Aquitaine Oil and Gas, Getty Oil Co., Gulf Oil Corp., Phillips Petro-
leum Co., and Shell Oil Co. Id.
12. In 1977 DOI planned Lease Sale No. 53 which involved 2036 OCS tracts off the
19851
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fornia's coastal zone management program. 3 The district court14 en-
joined the lease sale, finding that the CZMA mandated a consistency
review.' 5 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit16 affirmed the
district court decision.' 7 A divided Supreme Court,"8 repudiating the
California coast. 104 S. Ct. at 659. DOI requested state and federal agencies to report
on potential energy reserves in this area and consulted with bidders, federal and state
agencies, environmental organizations, and the public as to which of the tracts it should
offer for lease. Id. DOI then selected 243 tracts, including 115 tracts in the Santa
Marin Basin. Id.
In July 1980, the California Coastal Commission, a state entity responsible for the
administration of the state's coastal management plan, determined that Lease Sale No.
53 was an activity "directly affecting" the California coast and demanded a consistency
determination pursuant to the CZMA. Id. DOI rejected California's finding that the
lease sale would "directly affect" the state's coastal zone, but eliminated from the pro-
posed lease sale all OCS land but the 115 tracts in the Santa Marin Basin. Id.
In December 1980, the California Coastal Commission found that revised Lease Sale
No. 53 "directly affected" the coastal zone and concluded that DOI should remove an
additional 29 tracts from the lease sale. Id. at 659-60 & n.l. California Governor
Brown argued for the exclusion of 32 additional tracts. Id. at 660 & n.2.
In April 1981, however, DOI again found that Lease Sale No. 53 would not "directly
affect" the coastal zone and proceeded with the lease sale. Id.
See infra note 48 for a discussion of the procedure for implementing the CZMA.
13. Respondents asserted that petitioners violated five federal statutes. California
ex rel. Brown v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359, 1366 (C.D. Cal. 1981), modified, 683 F. 2d
1253 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 104 S. Ct.
656 (1984). The most important of these claims within the context of this Comment
involves § 307(c)(1) of the CZMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (1982). See infra notes 37-52
and accompanying text for a discussion of the history and interpretation of this statute.
The other statutes at issue were the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4447 (1982), the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1982), the
Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1982), and the National En-
vironmental Policy Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4447 (1982). 520 F. Supp. at 1366.
14. California ex reL Brown v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1981), modified,
683 F. 2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Secretary of the Interior v. California,
104 S. Ct. 656 (1984).
15. The district court analyzed the policies, statutory purpose, and legislative his-
tory of the CZMA and concluded that "the consistency requirements should apply
when a federal agency initiates a series of events which have consequences in the coastal
zone. Any other interpretation would thwart the purposes of the Act." 520 F. Supp. at
1374. Although the district court declined to hold that lease sales would always "di-
rectly affect" a state's coastal zone and thus require regular consistency determinations,
the court observed that lease sales "would invariably directly affect the coastal zone in
all but the most unusual case-a case which probably could only be posed as a hypo-
thetical." Id. at 1380.
The district court ruled against respondent's other four statutory claims. Id. at 1389.
16. California ex rel. Brown v. Watt, 683 F. 2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom.
Secretary of the Interior v. California, 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984).
17. In upholding the district court's interpretation of the CZMA, the Ninth Circuit
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lower courts' interpretation of the CZMA, reversed.
The states and the federal goverment long have shared the power to
regulate submerged lands within the jurisdiction of the United States. 19
The Supreme Court declared in 1845 that title to the submerged lands
beneath the marginal sea2' is vested in the states.2 The federal govern-
ment, with only minor exceptions, 22 acquiesced in state ownership of
these lands for an entire century. 23 By 1945, however, the federal gov-
ernment desired control of this territory and challenged the states' do-
not only ruled that Lease Sale No. 53 would directly affect the coastal zone, but ob-
served that the sale:
[E]stablishe[s] the first link in a chain of events which could lead to production and
development of oil and gas on the individual tracts leased. This is a particularly
significant link because at this stage all the tracts can be considered together, taking
into account the cumulative effects of the entire lease sale, whereas at the later
stages consistency determinations would be made on a tract-by-tract basis.
683 F.2d at 1260.
18. 104 S. Ct. at 656 (5-4 decision). See infra notes 77-105 and accompanying text
for a complete discussion of the Court's opinion.
19. For a more detailed discussion of the history of the OCS federal-state jurisdic-
tional conflict, see E. BARTLEY, THE TIDELANDS OIL CONTROVERSY (1953); Note,
State's Rights in the Outer Continental Shelf Denied by the United States Supreme Court,
30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 203 (1975).
20. The marginal sea represents the three-mile wide area of water surrounding a
nation's coastline. See The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116,
137 (1812) (dictum). See generally Heinzen, The Three-Mile Limit: Preserving the Free-
dom of the Seas, 11 STAN. L. REV. 597 (1959) (evolution of the three mile marginal
sea).
21. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 21? (1845). State title to the sub-
merged lands was grounded upon the theory that ownership passed from England to the
states as independent sovereigns at the time of the American Revolution. It was actu-
ally unclear, however, whether the marginal sea was recognized to have a territorial
component in 1776. E. BARTLEY, supra note 19, at 19-22. This fact was pivotal in the
later modification of Pollard's Lessee in United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
22. The Commerce clause and national defense powers gave the federal government
limited powers in the marginal sea. See Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 272
(1897); E. BARTLEY, supra note 19, at 39. The states nonetheless retained title to the
lands beneath the marginal sea. Gibson, 166 U.S. at 272; E. BARTLEY, supra note 19, at
41.
23. During this time, the federal government allowed California, Texas, and Louisi-
ana to issue mining permits for OCS lands beneath the marginal sea. E. BARTLEY,
supra note 19, at 99, 128-3 1; Krueger, An Overview of Changes Occurring in the Law of
the Sea-Implications for Federal-State Relation, 10 NAT. RESOURCES LAW 226, 228-
29 (1977). Furthermore, the federal government issued no mining permits of its own
because it assumed that title to these lands was vested in the states. H.R. REP. No.
1778, 80th Cong. 2d Sess., App. I, reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1415, 1417.
1985]
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minion.24 The Supreme Court resolved this dispute in United States v.
California25 by stripping the states of their title to the marginal sea.26
Congress responded to the Supreme Court's decision by enacting the
Submerged Lands Act27 and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(OCSLA)2" in 1953. The Submerged Lands Act restored the states'
title to the bed and the resources of the marginal sea.29 The Act reaf-
firmed the federal government's "paramount powers" 30 over this area,
but explicitly excluded control over resources from those powers.31
24. The federal government took two steps to perfect its claim to the marginal sea.
President Truman issued a proclamation asserting jurisdiction over the OCS. Procla-
mation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945), reprinted in 59 Stat. 884 (1945). For a
complete discussion of the Truman Proclamation, see Hollick, U.S. Oceans Policy: The
Truman Proclamation, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 23 (1976). Although the proclamation had
no affect upon the states' title to the marginal seabed, it forestalled future state claims to
the OCS. E. BARTLEY, supra note 19, at 142.
The United States also filed suit against California seeking a declaration of the federal
government's rights in the marginal sea and an injunction preventing the state from
leasing further offshore oil tracts. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 38-39
(1947); Breeden, supra note 1, at 1110-11. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text
for further discussion of United States v. California.
The federal government renewed its interest in the marginal sea after post-World War
II technology permitted more extensive exploration of these lands and unveiled the eco-
nomic potential of OCS resources. See H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 2, at 56; Krue-
ger, The Development and Administration of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands of the
United States, 14 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 643, 675 (1960).
25. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
26. The Court found that a territorial concept of the marginal sea was merely a
"nebulous suggestion" at the time of the Revolution. Id. at 32. The Court distin-
guished Pollard's Lessee on the ground that the land at issue in that case was submerged
under inland waters where local concerns supported control by the state. Id. at 34-36.
In the marginal sea, however, the Court declared that local concerns must yield to
considerations of national sovereignty. Id. Specifically, Justice Black found that the
federal government must have exclusive control over this area to execute its duties
under the Constitution and as a member of the international community. Id. at 29, 34-
40. The Court held that "full dominion over the resources of the soil under [the margi-
nal sea] including oil," is incidental to the government's "paramount rights." Id. at 38-
39. Since United States v. California, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the doctrine of
paramount powers. See United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975); United States v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 669 (1950).
27. Pub. L. No. 83-31, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1315 (1982)).
28. Pub. L. No. 67-212, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-1356 (1982)).
29. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(l) (1982).
30. See supra note 26.
31. 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1982).
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The OCSLA established federal jurisdiction over the OCS and its
mineral resources beyond the three mile marginal sea.32 Specifically,
the Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to lease OCS mineral
resources3 3 and gave the Secretary broad discretion to promulgate leas-
ing regulations.3 4 This legislation focused closely upon the "urgent
need" to explore and develop OCS oil and gas resources35 and largely
excluded state participation in this development.3 6
Congress passed the CZMA in 1972 in an attempt to halt deteriora-
tion of the coastal zone 37 caused by OCSLA-facilitated 38 OCS develop-
32. Id. at § 1332(a).
33. Id. at § 1337(a). Authorization of federal leasing of OCS oil and gas resources
was a major impetus for passage of the Act because the federal government previously
had lacked this power. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 2, at 57.
34. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(1) (1982). For a detailed explanation of OCS leasing proce-
dure under the OCSLA, see Linsley, Federal Consistency and Outer Continental Shelf
Oil and Gas Leasing: The Application of the "Directly Affecting" Test to Pre-Lease Sale
Activities, 9 B.C. ENVTL. L. REV. 431, 447-53 (1980). See also McDonald, Federal
Energy Resource Leasing Policy, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 747 (1978) (analysis of federal
leasing policy).
35. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 2, at 53.
36. The Secretary exercised exclusive managerial authority over the OCS and had
no obligation to consult the states regarding his decisions. S. REP. No. 277, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1975), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1972, AS
AMENDED in 1974 AND 1976 WITH A SECTION-BY-SECTION INDEX 729 (Comm. Print
1976) [hereinafter cited as CZMA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. Furthermore, the states
received no lease revenues, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1334, 1337, 1338 (1982), nor were they allowed
to extend their taxing jurisdiction to the OCS. Id. § 1333(a)(2)(A). The Act does re-
quire that state laws consistent with federal laws be applied to OCS activities. Id. The
federal government, however, administers these state laws. Id.
Congress passed the OCSLA without a major conflict because certain controversial
sections of the Submerged Lands Act drew the majority of congressional and public
attention. Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key to a New Frontier,
6 STAN. L. REV. 23, 23 (1953).
37. CZMA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 36, at 736-37; see also supra note 4
(congressional policy underlying the CZMA).
38. One congressional report noted that the 1953 OCSLA provided "an open-ended
grant of authority to the Secretary of the Interior to proceed with leasing on the Outer
Continental Shelf, [and] was based on... expectations that offshore production would
be a relatively small supplement to the continued reliance on production from onshore
fields." H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 2, at 102.
The same report observed that the broad grants of federal authority under the OC-
SLA were:
[E]ssentially a carte blanche delegation of authority to the Secretary of the Interior.
The increased importance of OCS resoutces, the increased consideration of envi-
ronmental and onshore impacts and emphasis on comprehensive land use planning,
1985]
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ment3 9 The CZMA encourages states to develop comprehensive
management programs for their coastal zones.4° Becuase state partici-
pation under the CZMA is voluntary,4 1 the Act provides two incen-
tives. First, the federal government will provide grants to cover a
percentage of the management program's administrative costs.4 2 Sec-
ond, once the Secretary of Commerce43 approves a coastal plan,' the
CZMA empowers the state to require that specified federal activities be
consistent with that plan.4 5
The CZMA contains several consistency provisions.4 6 One of these
require that Congress detail standards and criteria for the Secretary to follow in the
exercise of his authority.
Id. at 54.
39. A massive blowout of an oilwell in the Santa Barbara Channel in 1969 focused
national attention on OCS leasing. See generally Krueger, International and National
Regulation of Pollution from Offshore Oilwell Production, 7 S.D.L. REV. 541 (1970);
Utton, A Survey of National Laws on The Control of Pollution from Oil and Gas Opera-
tion on the Continental Shelf, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 331 (1970); Walmsey, Oil
Production Problems Arising Out of Exploitation of the Continental Shel. The Santa
Barbara Disaster, 9 S.D.L. REV. 514 (1972); Note, The Oil Men and the Sea: The Fu-
ture of Ocean Resource Development in Light of Santa Barbara-Some Proposals to Rec-
tify Continuing Inadequate Federal Regulation of Offshore Oil Leasing, 11 ARIZ. L.
REV. 677 (1969).
A 1969 report by the Commission of Marine Science, Engineering and Resources (the
Stratton Commission) also detailed the increasing demands upon the coastal zone and
expedited passage of the CZMA. See Yi, Application of the Coastal Zone Management
Act to Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sales, 6 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 159, 162-63
(1982).
40. See 16 U.S.C. § 1452 (1982).
41. See id. at § 1451.
42. Id. at § 1455(a). For a complete discussion of federal grant procedures under
the CZMA, see Comment, Offshore Federalism: Evolving Federal-State Relations in
Offshore Oil and Gas Development, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 401, 417-20 (1984).
43. Congress delegated the authority to administer the CZMA to the Department of
Commerce (DOC). 16 U.S.C. § 1463 (1982). The DOC has directed that the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), a subdivision of the DOC, enforce
the CZMA through the Office of Coastal Zone Managment, a subdvision of the NOAA.
15 C.F.R. § 923.2(b) (1985). Recent legislation would establish the NOAA as an in-
dependent agency. H.R. 3381, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); see NOAA as an Independ-
ent Agency: Hearings on H.R. 3381 Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-207 (1983).
44. Approval by the Secretary of Commerce ensures that the state managment pro-
gram sufficiently embraces national concerns. See 16 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1982).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1982). See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the consistency provisons and the federal activities to which they apply.
46. The CZMA currently includes five distinct consistency provisions which apply
to various federal activities: (1) § 307(c)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (1982) (activities
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provisions, section 307(c)(1),4 7 applies to federal activities that "di-
rectly affect" a state's coastal zone and requires that those federal ac-
tivities be consistent with the state programs "to the maximum extent
practicable."4 This language, particularly the phrase "directly affect,"
is nebulous4 9 and neither the legislative history5" nor the administra-
tive interpretations5 of the section clarify the type of federal activities
conducted or supported by a federal agency which directly affect the coastal zone);
(2) § 307(c)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(cX2) (federal development projects within the coastal
zone); (3) § 307(c)(3)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1982) (activities of applicants for
federal licenses or permits where the proposed activities will affect land or water uses in
the coastal zone); (4) § 307(c)(3)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B) (1982) (plans for the
"exploration or development of, or production from any area that has been leased under
the [OCSLA]" and affects land or water uses in the coastal zone); and (5) § 307(d), 16
U.S.C § 1456(d) (1982) (federal programs which fund state and local government
projects that affect the coastal zone). This Comment will focus only on § 307(c)(1) and
(c)(3). For an analysis of all consistency provisions, see Linsley, supra note 34.
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (1982). Section 307(c)(1) provides that "[e]ach Federal
agency conducting or supporting activities directly affecting the coastal zone shall con-
duct or support those activities in a manner which is, to the maximum extent practical,
consistent with approved state management programs." Id. See infra note 48 for a
discussion of the application of this provision.
48. 16 U.S.C. § 14S6(c)(1) (1982). The Office of Coastal Zone Management has
promulgated regulations establishing a detailed procedure for applying § 307(c)(1) to a
federal activity. See 15 C.F.R. § 923.2(b) (1985). First, the federal agency determines
whether its activity will have a "direct effect" on the coastal zone management pro-
gram. Id. at § 930.33(a). If so, the federal agency must provide a formal notice or
consistency determination to the administrator of the state program that it will conduct
its activities in a manner consonant with the state program. Id. at § 930.34(a). Should
the federal agency determine that its activity will not have a direct effect on the state
program, it must provide the state with a formal written notice of this conclusion called
a "negative determination." Id. at § 930.35(d). If a dispute arises as to the accuracy of
a consistency determination or negative determination, either party may submit the
matter to the Secretary of Commerce for mediation. Id. at § 930.110-. 116.
49. See supra note 7.
50. The original CZMA bills generated by the House and the Senate applied
§ 307(c)(1)'s consistency requirement to federal activities "in" the coastal zone. See
H.R, 14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 307(c)(1) (1972), 118 CONG. REC. 26,487 (1972); S.
3507, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 314(b)(1) (1972), 118 CONG. REC. 14,187 (1972). The
House-Senate Conference Committee replaced "in the coastal zone" with the "directly
affecting" standard and both houses of Congress passed the bill without noting the
change. H. CONF. REP. No. 1544, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 15 reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4822, 4824.
Evidence exists suggesting that the Conference Committee's language did not
broaden § 307(c)(1). See, e.g., 118 Cong. Rec. 14,180 (1972) (various statements re-
stricting the jurisdiction of the CZMA). The Conference Committee also rejected two
sections of the original House bill that applied the consistency requirements to OCS
leasing. H. CONF. REP. No. 1544, supra at 8, 31.
51. In 1976 the NOAA issued the first proposed CZMA regulations, but failed to
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Congress intended to subject to this consistency requirement.52
Another consistency provision, section 307(c)(3)(A),53 applies to
nongovernmental applicants for federal licenses or permits to conduct
activities affecting a state's coastal zone. Applicants for such licenses
or permits must certify that their activities will be conducted in a man-
ner consistent with state management programs.54 If a state disagrees
with the certification of consistency, the federal government will deny
the application unless the Secretary of Commerce overrides the state's
objection. 5
Congress amended the CZMA in 1976.56 The amendments repre-
sented a growing congressional recognition that OCS development
define "directly affecting." 41 Fed. Reg. 42,878-79 (1976). Rather, the NOAA deter-
mined that "[the] terms will speak for themselves and difficulties will be addressed on a
case by case basis." Id. at 42,880. In 1978 the NOAA construed § 307(c)(1) to apply to
"all federal actions which were capable of significantly affecting the coastal zone" (em-
phasis added). 43 Fed. Reg. 10,510, 10,511 (1978); see also Linsley, supra note 34, at
431, 445-46 (evolution of the 1978 regulations).
The NOAA changed its regulations again in 1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,142 (1979). This
alteration came in response to a Department of Justice Opinion which concluded that
the application of consistency requirements depends upon the facts in each particular
case. Department of Justice Advisory Opinion rendered for the Department of Com-
merce and the Department of the Interior, 13-14 (April 20, 1979). Accordingly, the
NOAA amended its regulations to comply with the Justice Department opinion by
striking the "significantly affecting" language and returning to the undefined "directly
affecting" standard. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,141-42 (1979).
In 1981 the NOAA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that stated lease
sales do not directly affect the coastal zone. 46 Fed. Reg. 26,660 (1981). This regula-
tion was withdrawn, however, after Congress exercised a "legislative veto." 47 Fed.
Reg. 4231 (1982).
The Supreme Court aptly observed that the NOAA, "in construing § 307(c)(1) ...
has walked a path of such tortured vacillation and indecision that no help is to be
gained in that quarter." Secretary of the Interior v. California, 104 S. Ct. 656, 661 n.6
(1984).
52. The ambiguity of this language is at the heart of the controversy in Secretary of
the Interior v. California, 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984). See infra notes 77-105 and accompany-
ing text.
53. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1982).
54. Id. The state reviews the proposed activity and informs the federal licensing
agency within six months of its approval or objection. Id. The federal agency cannot
issue the license or permit until the state consents or the six month period expires with-
out a response from the state. Id
55. The Secretary of Commerce may override the state's objection if he finds that
the activity is consistent with the state plan or otherwise necessary in the interest of
national security. Id.
56. Pub. L. No. 94-370, 90 Stat. 1013 (1976) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1456(a), (c)(3)
(1982)).
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could have severe effects on the coastal zone.57 The legislation left ex-
isting consistency provisions intact5" and added a new consistency pro-
vision 9 that reinforced the states' power to influence OCS
development. The new provision, section 307(c)(3)(B), requires OCS
lessees to certify that any planned development, exploration, or pro-
duction will be consistent with the affected state management pro-
grams.' The procedure followed under this provision is nearly
identical to that prescribed by section 307(c)(3)(A). If the state objects
to the proposed activity on the ground that it is inconsistent with the
state's management plan, the federal government will not issue a per-
mit or license for the activity unless the Secretary of Commerce decides
to override the state's remonstrance.61
While the amendments contain no express regulation of OCS leasing
and language explicitly regulating leasing was deleted from the legisla-
tion, evidence exists in the legislative history that Congress intended
57. S. REP. No. 277, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-19 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 878, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 15-17, 119-26 (1976). The 1973 Arab oil embargo and the resulting
increase in domestic oil and gas production heightened concern for the coastal zone.
H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 2, at 100.
58. The Conference Committee tabled action pending the outcome of oversight
hearings. H.R. REP. No. 1298, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1820, 1828. The reports on the 1976 amendments from both
houses of Congress emphasize the importance of the consistency provisions in providing
an incentive for state participation in the CZMA and in minimizing the adverse effects
of OCS development. The House report states, "[O]ne major encouragement [for state
participation] has been the belief that in the future, the impacts which flow from federal
Outer Continental Shelf leasing will have to conform to state and local prescriptions
about the best location for energy support and industrial facilities." H.R. REP. No.
878, supra note 57, at 53. The Senate report states:
One of the specific federally related energy problem areas for the coastal zone is,
of course, the potential effects of federal activities on the Outer Continental Shelf
beyond the state's coastal zones, including federal authorizations for non-federal
activity, but under the act as it presently exists, as well as the S. 586 amendments, if
the activity may affect the coastal zone and it has an approved management pro-
gram, the consistency requirements do apply.
S. REP. No. 277, supra note 57, at 37.
For a detailed discussion of the 1976 CZMA amendments, see Note, The Coastal
Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976, 1 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 259 (1976).
59. § 307(cX3)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B) (1982).
60. Id.
61. Id. As under § 307(cX3XA), the Secretary can override the state's objections if
he finds that the activity "is consistent with the objectives of [the CZMA] or is other-
wise necessary in the interest of national security." Id. For further discussion of the
amendment's consistency procedures, see Linsely, supra note 34, at 453-55.
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leasing to be subject to the consistency requirements of the CZMA.62
In addition to these amendments, Congress enacted a system of federal
financial aid to help states cope with the impact of OCS leasing.63
Congress passed the 1978 OCSLA amendments" to expedite devel-
opment of OCS resources for domestic energy needs, to balance OCS
development with protection of the environment, to preserve competi-
tion in OCS development, to insure the public a fair return on OCS
resources, and to allow coastal states the opportunity to participate in
policy and planning decisions relating to OCS resources. 65  These
amendments advanced two major reforms to correct the inequities of
the 1953 Act.66 First, the amendments imposed a structured lease de-
cision-making process upon the Secretary of the Interior. 67 Second,
the revisions granted the states a functional role in the lease develop-
ment process by requiring the Secretary of Interior to submit any pro-
posed leasing program to affected coastal states for review and
comment.68 Furthermore, the legislation specifically provided that it
62. The bills coming from both houses attempted explicitly to apply this section to
leasing. H.R. 3891, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(15) (1976); S. 586, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 102(12) (1975). Furthermore, the reports state that the amendment served only "to
make explicit the Committee's original intent to include leases as actions that come
under the purview of this section." H.R. REP. No. 878, supra note 58, at 52 (emphasis
added). See S. REP. No. 277, supra note 57, at 19, 36-37, 53. Although the House later
deleted the term "leases" from § 307(c)(3), H.R. CONF. REP. 1298, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
30 (1976), the legislators' remarks clearly manifest their intent to maintain leasing sub-
ject to state review. 122 CONG. REC. 6128 (1976). As Congressman DuPont explained:
My amendment is offered to strike that [term] not because I disagree with having
leases included. As a matter of fact I feel very strongly that leases should be in-
cluded.... So the purpose of this amendment is not to get rid of the word "lease"
but to allow us time to work on the problem a little bit longer.
Id.
63. Coastal Energy Impact Program, Pub. L. No. 94-370, 90 Stat. 1013 (1976)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1456a (1982)). This section provides federal grants and loans to
fund a portion of the coastal state's expenses for providing public facilities, public serv-
ices, and environmental maintenance. Id. For a more detailed analysis of this legisla-
tion, see Comment, supra note 42, at 422-24.
64. Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343
(1982)).
65. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 2, at 122-23.
66. For a discussion of the abuses that the 1978 amendments attempted to correct,
see Murphy & Belsky, OCS Development: A New Law and a New Beginning, 7
COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 297, 307-09 (1980); supra note 38.
67. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 2, at 62-65.
68. After the Secretary of the Interior prepares a leasing program, he must submit it
to the governors of affected coastal states for review and comment. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1344(c)(2) (1982); 43 C.F.R. § 3310.2(a)(1) (1984). An "affected state" is one in
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would not construe, modify, or repeal any part of the CZMA.69
Congress reauthorized the CZMA in 198070 "to reinforce and pro-
mote the progress states have made in resolving the struggles on their
coasts., 71 Aware of a dispute between California and the Department
of the Interior concerning the application of the CZMA's consistency
requirements to a federal OCS lease sale,72 Congress chose not to
amend the consistency provisions.73 The House Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Committee found that with the exception of the above dis-
pute, the consistency provisions "appeared to be working" and that
"changes to this section of the act were not now needed." 74 The Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation also confirmed
the value of the consistency requirements.75
In sum, attempts by the courts and the legislature to administer the
OCS represent a struggle to achieve a balance between state and federal
authority in light of energy demands and environmental welfare. The
result of this struggle is the uneasy partnership which exists between
the states qua custodian of the coastal zone and the federal government
qua overseer of OCS resources. One major flaw in this scheme was the
uncertainty regarding the application of the CZMA's consistency pro-
visions to OCS lease sales. Given the expanding role of the state in the
management of the OCS since the 1972 CZMA, courts and commenta-
tors that considered the issue generally supported a requirement of
which OCS activity may cause significant damage to the marine and coastal environ-
ments. 43 U.S.C. § 1331(f)(4)-(5) (1982). Next, the Secretary submits the leasing pro-
gram to Congress where state and local government officials may make
recommendations regarding the timing, size, and location of a lease sale. Id. at
§ 1345(a). The Secretary must accept these recommendations if they provide for a "rea-
sonable balance between the national interest and the well-being of the citizens of the
coastal state." Id. The Secretary's determination of whether to accept the state's rec-
ommendation controls unless it is arbitrary and capricious. Id. at § 1345(a)-(d).
69. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1340(c), 1345 (1982); H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 2, at 153
n.52. But see Linsley, supra note 34, at 435-37 (discussion of the inherent conflict be-
tween the CZMA and the OCSLA).
70. Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 96-464, 94 Stat. 2060
(1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1982)).
71. H.R. REP. No. 1012, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4362, 4383.
72. The dispute centered on a lease sale separate from that at issue in Secretary of
the Interior v. California, 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984). See H.R. REP. No. 1012, supra note
71, at 34.
73. H.R. REP. No. 1012, supra note 71, at 34.
74. Id. at 31.
75. S. REP. No. 783, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1980).
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consistency between coastal zone programs and OCS leasing.
7 6
In Secretary of the Interior v. California," however, the Supreme
Court found that federal OCS lease sales need not be consistent with
state coastal zone management programs because leasing is not an ac-
tivity "directly affecting" the coastal zone within the meaning of sec-
tion 307(c)(1) of the CZMA.7" Justice O'Connor, writing for the
majority,7 9 first dismissed the plain meaning of the Act as inconsequen-
tial.8" Second, in examining the legislative history, she found that the
addition of the "directly affecting" language to section 307(c)(1) 8 was
not an attempt by Congress to enlarge the scope of the statute.
8 2
Rather, it represented a compromise between members of the House
and Senate over the definition of the term "coastal zone."' 83 Third,
Justice O'Connor observed that Congress rejected every attempt to in-
corporate OCS activities into section 307.84 Fourth, Justice O'Connor
76. See, e.g., Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561, 574-76 (D. Mass.
1983), affid sub nom. Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983); Linsley,
supra note 34. Contra Moore, Outer Continental Shelf Development and Recent Appli-
cations of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1971, 15 TULSA L.J. 443 (1980) (argu-
ment for a narrow interpretation of the CZMA).
77. 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984).
78. Id. at 672.
79. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist joined Justice
O'Connor in the opinion. Id. at 660.
80. The Court found that because the CZMA neither defines "directly affects" nor
specifies which federal activities "directly affect" the coastal zone, the construction of
the plain meaning of the phrase urged by each party is unsupportable. Id. at 661. The
Department of the Interior asserted that "directly affects" meant " '[h]av[ing] a [d]irect,
[i]dentifiable [i]mpact on [t]he [c]oastal [z]one.'" Id., quoting Brief for Federal Peti-
tioner at 20. The respondents, on the other hand, contended that "directly affects"
meant "'[i]nitiating a [s]eries of [e]vents of [c]oastal [m]anagement [c]onsequence.'"
104 S. Ct. at 661, quoting Brief for Respondents at 10.
81. See supra note 50.
82. 104 S. Ct. at 661-62.
83. Id. at 662. The Senate version of the original CZMA bill sought to exclude
federal enclaves from the coastal zone. Id. The House bill included these federal en-
claves. Id. Justice O'Connor reasoned that the "directly affecting" language adopted
by the Conference Committee intended "to reach at least some activities conducted in
those federal enclaves excluded from the Senate's definition of 'coastal zone.'" Id. She
concluded, however, that because both of the original bills exempted federal activities
outside the three-mile marginal sea and because the Conference Committee's change
was merely the product of a compromise, a broad construction of the section is unjusti-
fied. Id.
84. Id. at 663. The Court cited numerous statements in the Congressional Record
purporting to limit the jurisdiction of the CZMA. Id. at 663 n. 1l. See supra note 50.
The Court also considered §§ 312(b) and 313 of the original House bill, found that they
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found that section 307(c)(3) rather than section 307(c)(1) subsumes
leasing."5 Section 307(c)(3), however, does not require consistency re-
views of OCS lease sales.86 In fact, Justice O'Connor reasoned that
Congress added section 307(c)(3)(B) as an alternative to applying the
consistency provisions of section 307(c)(1) to OCS leasing. 7 Finally,
Justice O'Connor concluded that even if she examined lease sales under
section 307(c)(1), they would not "directly affect" the coastal zone."
Because only limited activities are authorized by the purchase of a
lease, the possible effects on the coastal zone cannot be considered di-
rect."9 Justice O'Connor admitted that there is merit to the argument
that consistency of OCS leasing is best determined at the earliest possi-
ble stage."° She rejected this contention, however, as a policy consider-
ation contrary to the congressional intent evinced in the CZMA and
OCSLA.91
would have provided respondents with the same relief they now sought under
§ 307(c)(1), and observed that Congress rejected both sections. 104 S. Ct. at 664-65.
The Court wrote that "it is fanciful to suggest that the Conferees intended the 'directly
affecting' language of § 307(c)(1) to substitute for... specific and considerably more
detailed language." Id. at 665. But see infra note 95.
85. 104 S. Ct. at 667-68. The Court concluded that § 307(c)(1) is inapposite "if
only because drilling for oil and gas on the OCS is neither 'conducted' nor 'supported'
by a federal agency." Id. See supra notes 46, 56-63 for a discussion of these sections.
86. 104 S. Ct. at 668. Because § 307(c)(3) of the 1972 CZMA omitted the word
"lease" and attempts to include the term in the 1976 amendments failed, the Court
stated that "it is not for us to add to the statute what Congress twice decided to omit."
Id. But see supra note 60.
87. 104 S. Ct. at 668. The majority, citing the language of the statute, found that
§ 307(c)(3)(B) applies only to applicants for licenses or permits to explore, produce, or
develop oil or gas on the OCS. Id. But see supra note 62. To clarify the distinction
between a lease sale and the issuance of a license or permit, the Court relied upon the
OCSLA, to which § 307(c)(3XB) refers. 104 S. Ct. at 668.
In examining the 1978 OCSLA amendments, the majority found that there are four
distinct phases to developing an offshore oilwell: (1) preparation of a leasing program;
(2) lease sales; (3) exploration; and (4) development and production. Id. at 669-71.
Under this system, a leaseholder has only two rights: priority in exploration, produc-
tion, and development and the ability to conduct limited preliminary activities. Id. at
669. The purchase of a lease does not authorize full exploration, development, or pro-
duction which might trigger § 307(c)(3XB). Id. at 671. Thus, consistency review is
required only at the last two stages of oilwell development. Id. at 671.
88. 104 S. Ct. at 671-72.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 673.
91. Id. See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
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Dissenting, Justice Stevens92 excoriated the majority's interpretation
of the CZMA.9 a He first examined the majority's contention that sec-
tion 307(c)(1) is inapplicable to federal activities on the OCS and found
that assertion refuted by the plain language of the statue,94 its legisla-
tive history," its purpose,96 and the findings of the lower courts.
97
Second, Justice Stevens argued that the legislative developments since
the passage of the CZMA in 1972 support the requirement of a consis-
tency review for OCS lease sales that directly affect the coastal zone.98
92. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice Stevens in his dissent.
Id. at 672.
93. Id. at 673-89.
94. The dissent stated, "The plain meaning of the words ... indicates that the
words 'directly affecting' were intended to enlarge coverage of § 307(c)(1) to encompass
activities conducted outside as well as inside the [coastal] zone." Id. at 674.
95. Justice Stevens argued that the majority had misconstrued the legislative history
of § 307(c)(1). Id. at 675. He observed that both of the original CZMA bills intended
this section to apply to OCS activities. Id. at 675-76. In addition, he noted that the
House surrendered §§ 312(b) and 313 from its original bills only because the insertion
of "directly affecting" in § 307(c)(1) protected the same interests. Id. at 677. See supra
note 50. But see supra note 84 and accompanying text.
96. Justice Stevens observed that "Statutes should be interpreted in a manner con-
sistent with their underlying policies and purposes." 104 S. Ct. at 679. Moreover, he
noted that the CZMA contains numerous provisions that demonstrate a congressional
desire to achieve long range planning and close cooperation between the states and the
federal government in conducting or supporting activities that directly affect the coastal
zone. Id. Thus, according to Justice Stevens, § 307(c)(1) must apply to lease sales in
order to construe the statute in a manner consonant with its underlying purpose. Id.
Justice Stevens also observed that:
The only federal activity that ever occurs with respect to OCS oil and gas develop-
ment is the decision to lease . . . . If the leasing decision is not subject to consis-
tency requirements, then the intent of Congress to apply consistency review to
federal OCS activities would be defeated and this part of the statute rendered
nugatory.
Id. at 680 (emphasis in original).
97. The findings of fact made by the district court, 520 F. Supp. 1359, 1380-82
(D.C. Cal. 1981), and preserved by the court of appeals, 683 F. 2d 1253, 1260 (9th Cir.
1982), show that oil and gas production, "the intended and most probable consequence
[of federal lease sales]," will directly affect the coastal zone within the meaning of
§ 307(c)(1). 104 S. Ct. at 683.
98. 104 S. Ct. at 683-89. The dissent first pointed to the Coastal Energy Impact
Program and the House and Senate reports of the 1976 CZMA amendments. Id. at
683. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text. Next, the dissent cited the specific
language of the 1978 OCSLA amendments and the House Committee report as evi-
dence that this legislation did not affect the CZMA. 104 S. Ct. 686-87. See supra notes
68-69 and accompanying text. Finally, the dissent examined the 1980 CZMA amend-
ments and concluded that Congress reaffirmed the application of consistency require-
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The majority decision in Secretary of the Interior v. California9 9 mis-
interprets the history of the entire body of OCS legislation since the
CZMA.I ° ° The decision also ignores the fundamental congressional
objective underlying these enactments: Equalization of the interests of
OCS resource development and environmental preservation. 1 ' To at-
tain this goal, Congress, through thirty years of legislative endeavor,1 "2
established a strategy of collaboration between the federal government
and the coastal states. 113 As the demand for OCS resources grew and
the technology to harvest those resources improved, Congress coun-
tered ensuing environmental threats by increasing coastal state author-
ity to regulate federal activity in the coastal zone."° Secretary of the
Interior v. California °5 reverses this trend and upsets the balanced reg-
ulatory scheme created by Congress.
The Court's decision that federal lease sales need not be consistent
with state management programs will have wide-ranging impact.
First, it will impinge directly upon the policies and purposes of the
CZMA by restoring the Secretary of the Interior's carte blanche au-
thority to plan OCS leasing.' ° 6 Second, the decision imperils the con-
tinued vitality of the CZMA by destroying one of two major incentives
for coastal state participation.10 7 After the elimination of the states'
ments to lease sales. 104 S. Ct. at 688-89. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying
text.
99. 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984).
100. See supra notes 37-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history
and development of this legislation.
101. See supra notes 27-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of OCS legisla-
tion and underlying congressional policies.
102. Id. Congress enacted the Submerged Lands Act and the OCSLA in 1953. See
supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
103. 104 S. Ct. at 658-59.
104. Id. See Fairfax, Old Recipies for New Federalism, 12 ENVTL. L. 945 (1982).
105. 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984).
106. The Secretary of the Interior is free to ignore the legitimate environmental
concerns of coastal states while planning OCS oil and gas developments because states
can challenge the consistency of those developments only under § 307(c)(3)(B) when
exploration or development and production occurs. See supra note 87; see also supra
notes 38, 66-69 and accompanying text for a critical discussion of the Secretary of the
Interior's powers under the 1953 OCSLA.
Moreover, only the OCS developer is involved in consistency determinations at the
later stages of the development process. See supra notes 34, 87. Justice Stevens recog-
nized in his dissent that the federal government is no longer encumbered by consistency
constraints. 104 S. Ct. at 680. See supra note 96.
107. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text; Comment, supra note 42, at 434.
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ability to require that federal lease sales be consistent with coastal zone
programs, the only remaining incentive for state participation in the
CZMA is the prospect of federal funding."0 8 The future availability of
these funds, however, is uncertain."o Third, lease revenues for the fed-
eral government may decrease. Petroleum compaines will be reluctant
to commit millions of dollars" 0 to a lease that a coastal state could
thwart under later-stage consistency requirements."' Moreover, if the
Secretary found it necessary to cancel a lease, the federal government
would have to compensate the lessee." 2 Finally, and perhaps most im-
portantly, the states are effectively eliminated from any meaningful role
in an expansion of the territorial sea.113
It now becomes the responsibility of Congress to analyze the vestiges
of the CZMA. If Secretary of the Interior v. California"4 accords with
Congress' conception of the proper course of evolution for the CZMA,
Congress may acquiesce. If, however, Congress views the Court's deci-
sion as an attempt to abrogate a carefully designed legislative policy,
the legislature must amend the "directly affecting" language to obviate
the Court's decision." 15
David A. Streubel
108. See supra note 42.
109. The Reagan administration reduced federal funding for coastal zones. 13
ENV'T REPT. 2084, 2084-90 (BNA) (Mar. 18, 1983). Furthermore, President Reagan
sought to eliminate these state grant funds from his fiscal year 1985 budget request.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, APPENDIX,
BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FY 1985, I-F23 (1984). On May 31, 1984, how-
ever, the House passed a fiscal year 1985 appropriations bill for NOAA which would
provide $42 million for grants to states for administering coastal zone management pro-
grams. H.R. 5712, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
110. For example, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. bid $333,600,000 for one tract of Lease
Sale No. 53. L.A. Times, April 29, 1981, Part 1 at 1.
11. See supra note 98. Respondents asserted the economic appeal of determining
consistency as early as possible. Brief for Respondents at 38, Secretary of the Interior v.
California, 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984).
112. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2)(C) (1982). See Union Oil Co. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743,
750-51 (9th Cir. 1975).
113. See Knecht & Westermeyer, State v. National Interest in an Expanded Law of
the Sea, 11 COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 317 (1984) (argues that the states should play a
pivotal role in the 12 mile territorial sea that was established by the recently adopted
Law of the Sea Convention).
114. 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984).
115. A House bill introduced on January 23, 1984, sought to amend § 307(c)(1) and
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